



More Money, More Problems:  How Oklahoma’s Novel 
Approach to Ponzi Scheme Clawbacks in Oklahoma 
Department of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Blair Means 
More Uncertainty for Investors 
I. Introduction 
I believe Marsha’s gotten maybe an eight or a ten year [jail] 
sentence out of this . . . my wife and myself have gotten life 
sentences out of this.1  
By the time Bernard Madoff’s headline-grabbing Ponzi scheme (one of the 
largest ever discovered2) came crumbling down in late 2008,3 certain 
investors of Oklahoman Marsha Schubert had already experienced first-hand 
the legal and personal repercussions of such a fraudulent endeavor.4  While 
the monetary impacts of Schubert’s and Madoff’s respective schemes differ 
dramatically,5 both instances prompt real questions about the current abilities 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker (OETA television broadcast Sept. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.investedok.org/documentaries/Anatomy-RogueBroker_ 1000.asp.  Ponzi 
schemer Marsha Schubert pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in Oklahoma federal court and 
received a ten-year sentence.  Jay F. Marks, Former Investment Adviser Sentenced to 10 Years for 
Fraud, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.newsok.com/article/2910915? 
searched=marsha%20schubert%20 10%20years%20federal%20prison&custom_click=search.   
 2. Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2008, 
6:45 PM ET), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_1212croes 
us_inl.html.   
 3. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for 
Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-293.htm. 
 4. Temporary Restraining Order, Order Appointing Receiver, Order Freezing Assets 
and Order for Accounting at 1, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Schubert, No. CJ-2004-
256 (Logan Cnty. Ct. Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.securities.ok.gov/ Enforce 
ment/Orders/OrderInLineDisplay.asp?LinkAddress=TRO_SchubertAssociates_CJ-04-
256.pdf& FileNo=05-031. 
 5. Currently, claims by Madoff to the Securities Investor Protection Corp. amount to 
$57.2 billion.  Bob Van Voris, Phil Mattingly & Patricia Hurtado, SIPC Tells Congress 
$57.2 Billion Madoff Victims Claims Exceed Its Funds, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2010, 11:01 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-24/madoff-victim-claims-exceed-available-
sipc-funds-letter-shows.html.  The current clawback efforts in the Madoff case may even 
force certain owners of the New York Mets to consider selling some of their stake in the 
team to settle the clawback claim against them.  Alison Leigh Cowan & Richard Sandomir, 
Madoff Profits Fueled Mets’ Empire, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, available at 
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of courts and regulators to handle the aftermath of the fraudulent endeavor 
known as the Ponzi scheme.  The major controversy arises when attempting 
to reconcile the fact that some innocent investors lose up to their entire initial 
investment while others actually “profit” with returns on their investment 
capital (or at least believe such is the case while the scheme is still viable).  In 
the end, investors who lost their investments are left wondering what relief is 
available to them, people involved with the perpetration of the fraud face 
civil and criminal charges,6 and a different class of investors that actually 
made a return on their initial investment are confronted with the possibility of 
receivers or Bankruptcy trustees of the Ponzi-schemer’s estate “clawing 
back” those profits as part of a plan to repay creditors.   
An important and currently unresolved question asks:  should winning 
investors who received a “profit” from a fraudulent Ponzi scheme be able to 
retain those funds disguised as earnings?  Many courts accept the proposition 
that individuals who were fortunate to be winning investors in the Ponzi 
scheme should not be permitted to “enjoy an advantage over later investors 
sucked into the Ponzi scheme who were not so lucky.”7  But what if those 
investors had no knowledge of the scheme and simply sought out a risky 
investment, not a fraudulent one?  In equitable terms, when the house of 
cards comes crumbling down, some may allege that the winning investors are 
unjustly enriched at the cost of losing investors.   
As Madoff’s victims continue to challenge the proposed plans to 
“clawback” their profits to repay a fraction of what the losing investors 
(those who never saw the return of their investment and/or a profit) lost, 
state courts are similarly faced with the need to navigate the same murky 
waters of fairness vis-à-vis fraudulent funds.8  In early 2010, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court implemented an original approach regarding the limited 
equitable relief to which losing investors and other creditors of such a 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/sports/baseball/05mets.html?_r=1&hp.  In the Schubert 
case, the allegations maintained that eighty-seven people lost more than nine million dollars 
while more than 150 people “made” about six million dollars in the scheme.  See Okla. 
Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010). 
 6. “An overlap between civil and criminal law is apparent in examining cases 
involving securities fraud.  An individual violating securities statutes can be subject to civil 
and administrative proceedings, criminal prosecution, or dual civil and criminal actions.”  
ELLEN S. PODGER & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL 78 (4th ed. 
2009).  
 7. In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 8. See infra Part III.B. 
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scheme are entitled when it decided Oklahoma Department of Securities ex 
rel. Faught v. Blair.9  
In this case of first impression, the court established that a receiver or the 
Department of Securities “may proceed against the innocent investors to 
recover unreasonable profits received in excess of their investments in the 
Ponzi scheme”10 under an unjust enrichment theory.11  The issue after Blair, 
then, is if particular profits are not deemed unreasonable, will certain lucky 
winning investors be allowed to keep the tainted funds distributed to them as 
profit?  In the court’s quest to find the most equitable way to try to make 
defrauded investors whole, the Oklahoma decision may simply insert more 
gray into an already cloudy area. 
This note examines the current controversies regarding Ponzi scheme 
clawbacks and the potential lack of equitable remedies under Oklahoma’s 
latest judicial holding to make losing investors whole.  Given the ambiguity 
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision, any attempt to restore losing 
investors will be unpredictable and perhaps unmanageable.  Part II of this 
note provides a brief history of Ponzi schemes and the consequences when 
they inevitably fail.  Part III presents an overview of applicable law before 
the Oklahoma case and guiding trends from other states and federal 
decisions.  Part IV discusses the facts, central issues, and ultimate holding in 
Oklahoma Department of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Blair.12  Part V 
examines potential downstream effects stemming from the decision and 
presents questions of application.  Also considered is the potential impact of 
the holding on the established pro rata scheme of distribution and the 
suggestions of legislators to provide Ponzi-specific legislation to help 
alleviate the particularly controversial area of clawbacks.  Together these 
elements suggest that Oklahoma has implemented a standard of recovery that 
may create more potential problems than it solves.  This note briefly 
concludes in Part VI. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 9. 231 P.3d 645 (Okla. 2010).  
 10. Id. at 649. 
 11. Id. at 663. The other elements of the case—namely the role of the Oklahoma 
Department of Securities/receiver—are beyond the scope of this note. 
 12. 231 P.3d 645. 
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II. Ponzi Scheme Basics: Money, Lies, and Eventual Downfall 
Without exception, the returns promised by Ponzi schemes are too 
good to be true.13  
The following section highlights the basics of a Ponzi scheme as well as 
the major pieces and players involved in the scheme.  Roles within the 
scheme take on primary importance once the scheme collapses. 
The term Ponzi scheme itself comes from the failed, fraudulent enterprise 
of Charles Ponzi during the 1920s.14  Technically, the endeavor is defined as: 
[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by 
later investors generates artificially high dividends or returns for 
the original investors, whose example attracts even larger 
investments.  Money from the new investors is used directly to 
repay or pay interest to earlier investors, [usually] without any 
operation or revenue-producing activity other than the continual 
raising of new funds.15   
The object of the scam may differ, but many (like the scheme run by 
Marsha Schubert) focus on the sale and trading of securities.16  A scheme 
may begin as a legitimate enterprise and morph into a Ponzi scheme.  Others 
(like Schubert’s) are “classic” schemes where an initial lie becomes the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi Schemes, 34 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 217 (2010). 
 14. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). 
 15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).  
 16. The Securities Act of 1933 broadly defines a security as: 
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security feature, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, 
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest 
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or 
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign 
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
“security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing. 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).  This definition is the same in Oklahoma.  See 71 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 1-102 (2011).  See also Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 
(Okla. 2010). 
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foundation for an entire web of deception.17  Regardless of the beginning of 
the scheme, two classes of investors will exist when the enterprise fails:  
winning investors and losing investors.  The winning investors are those who 
“profited” from the scheme by recovering their initial investment and 
receiving a “profitable” return on that investment.  It is important to keep in 
mind that when dealing with a pure Ponzi scheme, there technically are no 
profits; newer investors’ money is simply disguised and reshuffled as profit 
as there is usually no real underlying business venture.18  Also, the very 
nature (and initial appeal) of a Ponzi scheme is to promise investors an 
inflated rate of return on their initial investment.19  For example, Marsha 
Schubert promised her investors returns of 30%.20  Conversely, the losing 
investors are those who lost some or all of their principal investment without 
the promised returns.21  Often these downstream investors simply lose 
because of timing as they entered the scheme too close to its collapse to 
“earn” a return on their investment or any type of profit.22 
The entire scheme, built by illusion upon illusion, will eventually fail.  The 
exact cause of the failure may be attributed to events like the detection of the 
scheme by state or federal securities officials23 or the fact that not enough 
new funds from investors are flowing in to keep the scam afloat, often 
because of a market downturn.24  Once triggered, the downfall of the scheme 
follows distinct routes based on the particular set of facts of the case.  An 
option in any route is the instigation of clawback claims as a means to make 
defrauded investors and creditors whole.  Where circumstances allow, the 
remaining estate may become a debtor under the terms of the Bankruptcy 
Code (that is, the trustee will be charged with paying losing investors and 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Plaintiff’s Petition at 11, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Farmers & 
Merchs. Bank, No. CJ-2006-3311 (Okla. Cnty. Ct. Apr. 21, 2006). 
 18. See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and 
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 158 (1998) (quoting Martino v. Edison 
Worldwide Capital, 189 B.R. 425, 437 n.17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)).  
 19. See id. (quoting Martino, 189 B.R. at 437 n.17).   
 20. Marks, supra note 1. 
 21. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures 
in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 
395 (2009). 
 22. See Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 13, at 208-09.  
 23. See, e.g., Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010) 
(highlighting that the Schubert Ponzi scheme was discovered by the Oklahoma Department 
of Securities who then commenced action in district court for injunctive relief and the 
appointment of a receiver for Schubert and Associates). 
 24. Tom Lauricella, Aaron Lucchett & Amir Efrat, Madoff Ran Vast Options Game, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2008, at A19.  
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creditors of the estate).25  The trustee will be able to incorporate the tools 
provided to it through the jurisdiction’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(herein UFTA) to attempt to reclaim some of the transferred funds.26  
Alternatively, under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee can seek 
to recover not only the profits of the Ponzi scheme but also a winning 
investor’s principal as a preference.27   
In cases outside of the bankruptcy context, the investors in the scheme 
may bring individual suits under applicable state law or “petition a state court 
for appointment of a receiver to liquidate the operator’s assets.”28  In the case 
that is the subject of this note, for example, the Oklahoma Department of 
Securities investigated the enterprise of Marsha Schubert after receiving an 
anonymous tip and, after uncovering evidence of the Ponzi scheme,29 
initiated action and moved forward with securing the appointment of a 
receiver.30  This process is similar at the federal level.31  
Next, the administrators of a state-based or federal securities32 action or a 
court-appointed receiver will be able to look to a particular jurisdiction’s 
UFTA to proceed against the winning investors through either a constructive 
or actual fraud approach.33  Currently, forty-three states (including 
Oklahoma34) and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA.35  Under 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 158.  Under 11 U.S.C. § 548, where the trustee 
can look to a jurisdiction’s UFTA, the general maxim remains that 
[i]nvestors are never able to keep the profits distributed by the Ponzi 
scheme . . . the “profits” that are credited to the investor are nonexistent, as 
they arise not from an underlying business venture but instead from outright 
theft.  To use a common maxim, if a Ponzi scheme robs Peter to pay Paul, Paul 
is not entitled to his misbegotten profits. 
James Butler Cash Jr., When Is an Equity Participant Actually a Creditor? The Effects of In 
Re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme Victims and the Good Faith Defense, 98 KY. L.J. 329, 336 
(2010). 
 26. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 160.   
 27. See id. at 181. 
 28. Id. at 158 n.8.  
 29. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1. 
 30. Temporary Restraining Order, Order Appointing Receiver, Order Freezing Assets 
and Order for Accounting, supra note 4, at 1. 
 31. See Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 13, at 94. 
 32. Under federal securities law there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over equitable 
suits and an action at law when the suit is brought to enforce a liability or duty established 
by federal securities law.  See Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 
§ U.S.C. 77v(a), 78aa (2006)).   
 33. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 160. 
 34. Oklahoma’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act can be found at 24 OKLA. STAT. § 
116 (2011). 
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such approach, the general maxim remains that a payment as profit above the 
initial investment is avoidable as a fraudulent transfer as “the money used for 
the underlying investments came from investors taken in by fraudulent 
representations.”36  
While it may seem “fair” for a winning investor in a UFTA Ponzi 
clawback to keep those profits seemingly made with his or her own money, at 
least when considering the situation solely as between the investor and the 
operator of the scheme, such a viewpoint “is not true as between him and 
either the creditors of or the other investors in the company.”37  After the 
scheme collapses, the Ponzi schemer himself does not retain the bulk of the 
funds.  Instead the money obtained from the scam has already been 
redistributed to other investors (or spent by the schemer himself), a fact that 
makes a Ponzi scheme clawback effort remarkably problematic.   
Significantly, using either approach regarding clawbacks available under 
the UFTA (and also through a jurisdiction’s UFTA availability to bankruptcy 
proceedings), the investor will at least be divested of his or her fraudulent 
profit in a successful claim by a trustee or receiver.38  Under a constructive 
fraud approach, the trustee can proceed with recovery of the “fictitious profits 
earned by the investor,”39 while under an actual fraud claim the trustee can 
attempt to recover both the fictitious profits and the return upon the investor’s 
initial investment.40 
As Blair demonstrates, however, there is a third avenue of action available 
through equity-based claims such as unjust enrichment.41  The cases 
discussed later in this note on the outcomes of such equity claims after the 
downfall of a Ponzi scheme reflect mixed results in terms of successful 
clawbacks, creating uncertainty for the various parties involved. 
Nonetheless, Blair highlights the specific goal of a receiver:  to “marshal 
and untangle a company’s assets without being forced into court by every 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Legislative Fact Sheet - Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title+Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act (last 
visited May 25, 2012).  Many of those jurisdictions that have not adopted the UFTA have 
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.  See McDermott, supra note 18, at 160. 
The distinctions among the UFTA, UFCA, and § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code are few; one 
of the main distinctions rests with their statutes of limitations.  Id. at 160 n.15. 
 36. Jeff Sonn, Ponzi Schemes – Picking Up the Pieces from a Fallen House of Cards, 
1755 PLI/CORP 443, 466 (Aug. 2009). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 397. 
 39. McDermott, supra note 18, at 160. 
 40. Id. at 173. 
 41. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 651 (Okla. 2010).  
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investor or claimant.”42  A receivership provides a “procedural vehicle to 
protect the underlying equitable rights . . . to funds that have been grossly 
mismanaged and dissipated by fraud.”43  The strength of the receivership 
rests in the accommodating procedural rules which provide effective 
protection of the equitable substantive rights at risk.44  For all practical 
purposes, the receiver steps into the shoes of the now-defunct enterprise and 
handles payments to investors and creditors (including the losing Ponzi 
scheme investors).  
In actuality, the ability of a receiver or trustee to reclaim funds is never 
simple, primarily due to the fact that most collapsed schemes have few 
physical or liquid assets remaining.45  Instead the failed scheme’s largest 
assets are usually the claims the estate has against the winning investors.46  
Hence, the trustee’s or receiver’s challenge is to sue those winning investors 
under the Bankruptcy Code or UFTA provisions, or to look to an equitable 
theory and, in the end, redistribute the funds to losing investors of the scheme 
and to other creditors.47   
Such an action against a winning investor has been deemed a “clawback” 
in today’s financial and legal vocabulary.  “Clawing back” encompasses the 
method for recouping losses under specific circumstances where inherent 
unfairness should not be allowed to stand.48  From the point of view of losing 
Ponzi scheme investors, clawbacks provide a real opportunity to see the 
return of some of their investment capital.  Put succinctly, “clawbacks 
function to bridge the gap in remedies under prevailing law for addressing 
unfair enrichment.”49  The endgame for the receivers or trustees revolves 
around a goal of making creditors, including losing investors, whole—a 
difficult mission to accomplish in an inherently unfair situation.  Ultimately, 
the underlying policy focuses on the amount of relief that can be provided as 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 13, at 203 (quoting United States v. Acorn Tech. 
Fund, 429 F.2d 438, 443 (3rd Cir. 2005)). 
 43. Blair, 231 P.3d at 665; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1554 (2011) (explaining that 
“[t]he receiver has, under the control of the court, power to bring and defend actions in his 
own name, as receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, to 
collect debts, to compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and generally to 
do such acts respecting the property as the courts may authorize”). 
 44. See Blair, 231 P.3d at 665. 
 45. McDermott, supra note 18, at 158. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 158-59.  
 48. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 410-11.  
 49. Id. at 414. 
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the receivers redistribute the funds “in either an attempt to make defrauded 
parties whole or to prevent unjust enrichment.”50 
III. Law Before the Case:  The Varying Approaches to Ponzi Scheme 
Clawback Litigation 
The relative lack of specific case law in Oklahoma dealing with Ponzi 
schemes, the claim of unjust enrichment within such a context, and the issue 
of the extent to which a receiver may pursue a winning investor require the 
court to look beyond the border of the state for guidance and existing (albeit 
non-binding) precedent.  The issues are numerous.  First, standing 
requirements must be met before a clawback claim can commence.  In 
Oklahoma, these requirements are satisfied by both statute and accepted 
principles of equity.51  Next, while the Tenth Circuit has declined to allow a 
receiver to clawback a winning investor’s profits through a theory of unjust 
enrichment,52 there is no consensus among the courts in general as to this 
issue and even less discussion as to any qualification of the amount that can 
be pursued by the receiver.  Finally, Oklahoma’s implementation of new 
standards in this context must be reconciled with previous state case law and 
broader policies accepting a pro rata scheme of distribution resulting from a 
receivership. 
Central for the discussion here, ultimately, is the fact that no other state 
court has imposed a reasonable or unreasonable standard of the actual amount 
of recovery in an unjust enrichment-based clawback effort.  Before Blair, 
cases involving such a claim fell into one of two camps:  either the funds 
transferred to winning investors as profit above their principal were 
considered to have unjustly enriched winning investors or not.53  A broad 
categorization of the applicable statutory provisions—be it through the 
Bankruptcy Code54 or UFTA—shows a similarly streamlined approach: 
the courts that have adjudicated the rights of trustees and Ponzi 
investors have appropriately refused to allow investors to retain 
any profit . . . To analyze the entire set of transfers to an investor, 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Spencer C. Barash & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback” 
Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922, 922 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 51. See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 661-65 (Okla. 2010). 
 52. See Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d, 833 F.2d 
908 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 53. See infra Part III.B 
 54. “[B]ankruptcy courts can, at a minimum, require the return of any profits [investors] 
received from the investment.” Cash Jr., supra note 25, at 330. 
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rather than focusing on the profit component, incorrectly assumes 
that there is something of value in a Ponzi scheme when in fact the 
whole series of transactions has been a sham.55  
A. Ability to Bring Equitable Relief Claims Against Winning Ponzi Investors 
Although the federal government often handles security offerings, the 
states still maintain an important position in many areas of securities 
regulation.56  State laws concerning the fraudulent transfers of securities may 
still have considerable impact.57  Not only are there securities violations from 
a Ponzi scheme itself, there are subsequent civil and/or criminal claims that 
result against the schemer himself and, downstream, against winning 
investors.  Blair results from such litigation.  In Blair, the court relied upon 
statutorily defined roles of the Oklahoma Department of Securities and the 
flexibility inherent in a receivership to clawback the funds in question 
through a theory of unjust enrichment.58  
The controversies and ultimate decision to allow the Department of 
Securities to pursue clawback litigation contain elements worthy of their own 
study, extending beyond the scope of this note.  However, the underlying 
equitable theme which the court relied upon built a foundation for the 
ultimate decision that is the focus of this note. 
The Oklahoma Department of Securities is created and governed by 
statute.59  Provisions of the Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act of 2004 grant 
powers to the Department of Securities as a government entity.  Critical for 
this discussion are the civil enforcement powers under 71 Okla. Stat. § 1-603.  
Subsection A of the statute directs the administration to “maintain an action” 
in the Oklahoma court system if the Department administrator believes a 
person is engaging in acts or practices that would violate the Securities Act.60  
Subsection B allows the administrator to take certain enforcement measures, 
including the ability to “[o]rder such other relief as the court considers 
appropriate.”61   
                                                                                                                 
 55. McDermott, supra note 18, at 168.  
 56. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 305 (Thompson/West 
6th ed. 2009). 
 57. See id. at 306.  
 58. See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 661-65 (Okla. 2010). 
 59. See 71 OKLA. STAT. § 1-601 (2011). 
 60. Id. § 1-603(A).  Specific provisions of the Act applicable to a Ponzi-schemer 
include: offering or selling a security in an act or practice that “would operate as fraud or 
deceit upon another person.” Id. § 1-501(3). Also, advising with untrue statements of 
material facts involved concerning the security offerings. See id. § 1-502(A)(2). 
 61. Id. § 1-603(B)(3) (emphasis added).  
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In State ex rel. Day v. Southwest Mineral Energy, Inc.,62 for example, the 
Department of Securities brought suit alleging the defendants had offered and 
sold interests in oil and gas wells without proper securities registration, 
grossly overvalued their drilling costs, and questionably transferred funds to a 
corporate account.63  The Department of Securities administrator, in addition 
to seeking specific injunctions, sought disgorgement (defined as “a 
mandatory order by the [c]ourt requiring those who obtain funds from 
investors or purchasers or lessees in violation of regulatory provisions, to 
‘disgorge’ themselves of the illegally obtained profits”64) through powers 
established in the Oklahoma Securities Act.65  Looking to similar decisions at 
the federal level66 (a recurring practice in the effort to harmonize state and 
federal securities regulation), the court cited the United States Supreme Court 
in explaining, “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and 
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full 
scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.”67 
In Oklahoma the distinction between courts of equity and of law has been 
abolished68 and the district courts enjoy unlimited original jurisdiction.69  
These facts subsequently led the court to declare “[o]nce the equity 
jurisdiction of the District Court has properly been invoked, the Court 
possesses the necessary power to fashion appropriate remedies . . . [this] 
includes the power to require ‘disgorgement’ of unlawful profits in 
appropriate cases.”70  While this case provides precedent for equitable actions 
charged by the Department of Securities, it does little to assuage the over-
riding fairness concerns within the context of a Ponzi scheme as to whom 
should ultimately have to pay. 
Day’s interpretation establishing equitable powers in state securities 
actions was in line with the larger federal securities regulation scheme and 
considered prominent and recurring themes of securities regulation:  
efficiency and enforcement capabilities.  Indeed, the Blair court subsequently 
recognized the State ex rel. Day decision as “consistent with federal courts’ 
                                                                                                                 
 62. 617 P.2d 1334 (Okla. 1980). 
 63. Id. at 1335. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 1336-37. 
 67. Id. at 1336 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)).  
 68. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 10 (1971) (repealed 1984). 
 69. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 7(a). 
 70. State ex rel. Day, 617 P.2d at 1338 (emphasis added).  
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construction of the purpose of federal securities laws to divest a wrongdoer of 
ill-gotten gains by the equitable remedy of disgorgement.”71 
Besides the Department of Securities having the opportunity to maintain a 
clawback claim, the court-appointed receiver similarly has such an ability.  In 
Oklahoma, although statute governs the appointment of a receiver, “in 
deciding questions arising under this head, the court must look for guidance 
to the established usages and customs heretofore prevailing in the courts of 
equity.”72  The issues that arise during the term of the receiver will thus be 
governed not by explicit statute but through the over-arching principles of 
equity.73  Because a receiver “steps into the shoes” of the defunct enterprise, a 
plaintiff-receiver may only bring suit to address the injuries to the actual 
entity in receivership—in this case, the defunct Ponzi estate.74   
The final element of the Oklahoma equity puzzle rests in the 
characterization of unjust enrichment.  The equitable theory of unjust 
enrichment provides a basis for remedies through the essential principles of 
equity, justice, and good conscience.75  In Oklahoma, unjust enrichment is 
specifically defined as: 
[a] right of recovery . . . [that] is essentially equitable, its basis 
being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good 
conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the 
expense of another ... [It] arises not only where an expenditure by 
one person adds to the property of another, but also where the 
expenditure saves the other from expense or loss.76   
The controversy that the courts must subsequently resolve, however, is 
how to reconcile these central tenants of equity as established in Oklahoma 
with the fact that a particular clawback will result in a seemingly inequitable 
result for at least one of the parties to the Ponzi scheme. 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 653 (Okla. 2010). 
 72. Ward v. Inter-Ocean Oil & Gas Co., 153 P. 115, 116 (Okla. 1915). 
 73. See Smoot v. Barker, 153 P.2d 227, 228 (Okla. 1944). 
 74. See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 75. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 9 (2011). 
 76. N.C. Corff P’ship v. OXY USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) 
(quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (1973)).  Unjust enrichment 
can generally be identified where there is “[a] benefit obtained from another, not intended as 
a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or 
recompense.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1678 (9th ed. 2009).  
2012] NOTES 817 
 
 
B. Divergent Clawback Approaches (but Predictable Results) 
Although the Oklahoma court concluded that the unjust enrichment theory 
may stand as the basis for the clawback effort, there is little evidence of a 
consensus among the courts on this particular issue.  Indeed, where courts 
have allowed an equitable theory to serve as the foundation for a clawback 
claim, there has been no mention of limiting such clawback in terms of 
reasonableness.   
Within the Tenth Circuit, for example, the trial court in Johnson v. 
Studholme77 declined the receiver’s suit to utilize an unjust enrichment claim 
after the downfall of a Ponzi scheme,78 focusing its analysis on what the 
receiver did not allege—that those winning investors in any way knew about 
or participated in the fraud.79  Instead, the investors simply received the 
returns that they were promised,80 and such investors were “purchasers for 
value” through their initial risky investments.81  Ultimately the court held that 
the receiver, in attempting to meet the burdens of unjust enrichment as to the 
investors, did not present an instance where it would be inequitable for the 
defendants to keep the payments—one of the elements in satisfying an unjust 
enrichment cause of action.82  Johnson stands for the proposition that Ponzi 
funds represent a zero sum game:  either the funds representing profit serve to 
unjustly enrich an investor or they do not.   
However, as there is no clear-cut fault by the winning investors in a Ponzi 
scheme, the courts continue struggling to find a balance when both winning 
and losing innocent investors are caught in the crosshairs.  For example, the 
court in Chosnek v. Rolley83 found that Ponzi investors are not unjustly 
enriched “so long as the returns do not exceed the amount of the original 
investment.”84  Whether or not the investor “broke-even” is the measuring 
point here.  In Chosnek, a losing investor of a Ponzi scheme brought an 
unjust enrichment claim against a certain group of winning investors in 
conjunction with the court-appointed receiver.85  The Indiana court focused 
on the fact that the winning investors received their profits in good faith 
                                                                                                                 
 77. 619 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987).  
 78. Id. at 1348. 
 79. Id.   
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1349. 
 82. Id. at 1350. 
 83. 688 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
 84. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).  
 85. Id. at 204. 
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while unaware of the underlying scam.86  However, the ultimate holding is 
not an absolute bar to a clawback effort:  “[t]o the extent of the original 
investment, such [returns] are not subject to claims made by later investors on 
the theory of unjust enrichment.”87  Thus an investor’s original investment 
will avoid an unjust enrichment claim but the profits may not. 
Successful clawbacks under a UFTA theory similarly present a uniform 
practice regarding the amount available for disgorgement:  once the profits 
are classified as fraudulent under the UFTA, they are all fraudulent regardless 
of whether they happened to fall into the hands of an innocent investor.  This 
perspective is accepted because of the illicit nature of a Ponzi scheme.  Due 
to the commingling of funds, shoddy record keeping, and outright lies, it 
would prove tremendously difficult, if not impossible, to trace specific funds 
to affirm or disprove their origin.  In Donell v. Kowell,88 for example, the 
court not only noted the “largely uniform practice” of applying the UFTA to 
Ponzi-scheme related proceedings,89 but also that the UFTA applies to those 
innocent investors who made a profit.90  The simple, general rule remains that 
“to the extent innocent investors have received payments in excess of the 
amounts of principal that they originally invested, those payments are 
avoidable as fraudulent transfers.”91  The concept of equity arises even 
through this statutory analysis as the court finds it “more equitable to attempt 
to distribute all recoverable assets among the defrauded investors who did 
not recover their initial investments rather than to allow the losses to rest 
where they fell.”92   
C. The Outcome:  Pro Rata Distribution and an Attempt to Make Defrauded 
Investors Whole 
Once the receiver successfully claws back the profits from the scheme, a 
pro rata distribution system is widely accepted as the most equitable method 
to treat creditors of the estate.  Tracing, which is not a remedy but a tool, is a 
way a particular claimant can distinguish his or her property within the estate 
of the offender (in this case the Ponzi-schemer).93  Initially it would seem the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 210. 
 87. Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added). 
 88. 533 F.3d 762  (9th Cir. 2008). 
 89. Id. at 770. 
 90. Id. at 776. 
 91. Id. at 770. 
 92. Id. at 776 (emphasis added). 
 93. Claire Seaton Rosa, Should Owners Have to Share? An Examination of Forced 
Sharing in the Name of Fairness in Recent Multiple Fraud Victim Cases, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1331, 1336 (2010). 
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best place to start to redistribute the funds would be through directly tracing 
the funds; however, the facts of the administration of a Ponzi scheme 
interfere and provide an insurmountable roadblock.  Essentially, the 
commingling of funds and less-than-ideal record keeping of the scheme make 
it logistically impossible to directly trace each investor’s funds.  The Supreme 
Court’s holding in this area in the case of Cunningham v. Brown94 was 
summarized by one commentator thus:  
tracing presumptions cannot be justified (and must therefore be 
suspended) when the parties fighting over unidentifiable, 
commingled property are all victims of the same fraud . . . .  In 
such a case, the money or other property is to be distributed pro 
rata among those who can show their money went into the 
account, but are unable to satisfy the tracing burden without the 
use of presumptions.95  
This rule from Cunningham means that, in practice, all the victims would 
share the recovered money proportionate to their own losses.96 
The Oklahoma case of Adams v. Moriarty97 similarly held that more recent 
investors of a Ponzi scheme endeavor could not utilize tracing to reclaim their 
newly invested money and that the Department of Securities was allowed to 
move forward with a pro rata distribution scheme concerning the losing 
investors.98  In 2003, James Adams deposited almost $400,000 of his 
retirement savings with the Hickman Agency; only nineteen days later, the 
firm was closed by the Department of Securities and Stephan Moriarty 
appointed receiver.99  The Adamses eventually opposed the receiver’s 
proposed plan to allocate the remaining funds from the Hickman Agency to 
investors on a pro rata scheme, arguing that as the last investors with the 
Hickman Agency they could trace their funds specifically.100   
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ultimately rejected the Adamses’ 
argument, instead accepting the Department of Security’s citations of 
authority that “remaining assets must be distributed to victims on a pro-rata 
                                                                                                                 
 94. 265 U.S. 1 (1924).  
 95. Id. at 1349 (citing Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 13). 
 96. See id. 
 97. 127 P.3d 621 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005). 
 98. See id. at 624-25. 
 99. Ron Jackson, They Lost Everything: Victims of a Meeker Ponzi Scheme Are Pulling 
Their Lives Back Together Three Years Later, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 23, 2007, available at 
http://newsok.com/article/3131666.  
 100. Adams, 127 P.3d at 622. 
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basis unless a particular creditor’s assets are able to be specifically traced.”101  
Since evidence could not be presented that those particular funds would be 
specifically traceable and distinguishable from monies deposited by other 
investors, the court upheld the pro rata scheme.102  The court’s rationale 
focused on the fact that if the most recent investors were allowed to claim the 
entirety of their investment, the earlier investors would be left with little or no 
monetary remedy.103  Such a situation would result in further inequity and an 
outcome “not in accord with the rules established in similar cases.”104   
In general, the “pro rata rule for Ponzi schemes” will mean that the assets 
remaining from the defunct scheme will be dispersed to creditors on a pro 
rata basis unless there is a rare instance where a specific claimant can 
expressly trace his or her assets.105  However, the very nature of a Ponzi 
scheme makes this a difficult feat, as once the funds from various investors 
are commingled into one account, “those assets lose their character as the 
peculiar assets of their investor.”106 
IV. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Marsha Schubert perpetrated a Ponzi scheme that attracted more than $200 
million dollars in investments from December 1999 through October 2004.107  
Acting as a registered agent of the firm of Schubert and Associates, Schubert 
consistently made oral statements to investors that their money would be used 
in trading option accounts and in day trading accounts.108  The investors 
relied on her verbal assertions that their accounts continued to hold hefty 
balances.109  Schubert was, in actuality, depositing the newly “invested” 
money into both her personal bank accounts and the accounts of Schubert and 
Associates.110  Despite her claims to investors otherwise, Schubert never used 
the monies in these accounts “to make any investment trades through the 
broker-dealers on behalf of the investors.”111  Because of her verbal reports of 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. at 624.  
 102. Id. at 625. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. See Rosa, supra note 93, at 1350. 
 106. Id. at 1350-51.  
 107. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
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success, many of Schubert’s clients re-invested their purported profits.112  
Most of the money apportioned for day trading endeavors was instead 
transferred into Schubert’s personal account and commingled with her 
personal funds.113  In actuality, Plaintiff subsequently alleged that less than 
1% of the money deposited was ever used to invest in option contracts, and 
no amount was used in day trading endeavors: in short, the only thing 
Schubert did was operate a classic Ponzi scheme.114  In the end, the damage 
was clear: approximately eighty-seven people lost an aggregate of over nine 
million dollars while, on the flip side, over 150 people allegedly made about 
six million dollars from their investments with Schubert.115 
As with any Ponzi scheme, Schubert kept the scam afloat by making 
payments to some of her investors at strategic times to prevent questions and 
discovery of the fraud.116 After the Department of Securities received an 
anonymous tip in October of 2004 and began an investigation, 117 the Ponzi 
scheme came crumbling down.118  The Department of Securities immediately 
began proceedings in Logan County for injunctive relief and the appointment 
of a receiver.119  The court-appointed receiver proceeded with marshalling 
and protecting the assets “for the benefit of claimants and creditors of 
Marsh[a] Schubert and Schubert and Associates.”120  In an effort to 
accomplish the task, the receiver (in a joint action with the Department of 
Securities) brought suit in the District Court of Oklahoma county against 158 
named defendants—those determined to have been paid a profit with funds 
from the Ponzi scheme.121   
The initial petition by the receiver and Department of Securities asserted 
claims of unjust enrichment and fraudulent transfer and sought an equitable 
lien against the real and personal property purchased by investors with funds 
from the Ponzi scheme.122  The claim of fraudulent transfer was later 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1. 
 113. Blair, 231 P.3d at 650. 
 114. Plaintiffs’ Petition at *7, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Mathews, No. CJ-
2005-3796 (Okla. Cnty. Ct. May 11, 2005). 
 115. Blair, 231 P.3d at 650. 
 116. See id.  One investor even explained that Schubert asked him what he thought he 
should have “earned” and immediately wrote a check to the investor above that value during 
a meeting in her office.  Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1. 
 117. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1. 
 118. Blair, 231 P.3d at 650. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 121. Id. 
 122. Plaintiffs’ Petition, supra note 114, at *8-10. 
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withdrawn, but the receiver and Department of Securities were granted a 
summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim against the defendants.123  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court consolidated the various appeals and issued a 
single opinion.124 
B. Issue and Holding 
After a comprehensive review of the competing legal and equitable claims, 
a divided court125 found that the Department of Securities had the ability to 
bring suit against the innocent winning investors of the Ponzi scheme.126  
Further, the opinion by Chief Justice James Edmonson held that the 
Department and receiver could proceed with claims against winning investors 
to recover the unreasonable profits surpassing their initial investments in the 
scheme.127  Justice Winchester, writing for the three dissenters, found the 
ultimate holdings short of satisfactory, especially the lack of guidance 
regarding the court’s unreasonableness standard.128   
C. Rationale of the Court 
After a brief discussion of the facts of Schubert’s Ponzi scheme, the court 
addressed the question of equitable action and the amount of recovery from 
innocent investors in turn. First, the court noted the statutory beginnings of 
the Department of Securities before proceeding with an analysis of whether 
its specific action was within the bounds of powers either expressly granted 
or that may be fairly implied “for the due and efficient exercise of the powers 
expressly granted.”129  The analysis found a basis for the Department of 
Securities to seek equitable relief.130  The appropriate relief would be 
disgorgement of the profits from a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by a 
Department of Security-regulated entity or requiring those holding the gains 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Blair, 231 P.3d at 651. 
 124. Blair, 231 P.3d at 651. 
 125. Justices Edmondson, Taylor, Opala, Colbert, and Reif comprised the majority, with 
Justices Hargrave, Kauger, and Winchester dissenting. Justice Watt did not participate in this 
decision.  Id. at 670.  
 126. Id. at 658. 
 127. Id. at 663, 665. 
 128. Id. at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting).  
 129. Id. at 652 (majority opinion) (alterations omitted) (citing Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. 
Okla. Dep’t of Cent. Servs., 55 P.3d 1072, 1083-84 (Okla. 2002)).  
 130. See id.  
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to expel those funds not in an effort to compensate the victims, “but to 
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.”131  
As a function of a state’s police or regulatory authority,132 the court 
reasoned, disgorgement furthers the public purposes and nature of securities 
law themselves when “the nature of the transaction between the Ponzi 
operator and innocent investor is inequitable and the innocent investor’s right 
to the funds becomes merely possessory.”133  The court implicitly adopted the 
Department of Security’s argument that the defendants, or winning Ponzi 
scheme investors, are nominal defendants (those that may have the funds and 
should be disgorged of them, even though no culpability is alleged134) when it 
held the district court had the necessary subject matter jurisdiction to rule as 
to the contending ownership claims of funds collected in the course of the 
Ponzi scheme.135 
In terms of obtaining equitable relief from Ponzi scheme investors, the 
court declined to hold that the money distributed as profit is per se 
inequitable as a matter of law and must ultimately be determined by a finding 
of both fact and law.136  Since an element of some wrongdoing is required to 
fulfill the present Oklahoma definition of unjust enrichment,137 the court 
stated it will require the Department of Securities or receiver to show that the 
conduct of solely possessing profit from a Ponzi scheme on its face 
constitutes “active wrongdoing or possession against equity and good 
conscience sufficient to justify a constructive trust imposed by a District 
Court.”138  The court reasoned that these factors together lead to the 
conclusion that the profits of a Ponzi scheme “received by an innocent 
investor may represent unjust enrichment when a reasonably equivalent value 
has not been exchanged.”139  “Reasonably equivalent value,” a statutory term 
of art, encompasses a situation wherein the Ponzi schemer’s assets are of a 
lower value after a transfer to an investor,140 not where there is an equal ratio 
of value “in” and value “out.” 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Id. at 654 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (internal 
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The Blair court adopted the rationale that the reasonably equivalent value 
within the context of a Ponzi scheme is a question of fact141 and can be found 
through examining “the discrete transaction between the debtor and the 
defendant, without regard to the nature of the debtor’s overall enterprise.”142  
The court argued that the acceptance of this approach aligns with an equitable 
examination of particular factual circumstances of a specific case for 
adjudication.143  The policy of clawing back funds from innocent investors as 
a blanket principle after such monies may have been spent is troublesome to 
the court, especially if only limited defenses may be available to an equity-
based claim.144  Considering all of these concerns, the court declined to adopt 
the Department of Security’s argument that there should be a right to 
restitution notwithstanding the reasonableness of the return paid to the 
investor.145  To adopt a per se rule would be contrary to equity, the court 
claimed, when the investor not only relied upon the counsel of a registered 
agent but also did not receive the promised artificially high rate of return on 
their initial investment.146 
Yet assuming that the named defendants were unjustly enriched by 
unreasonably high rates of return on their initial investment as profit, the 
court-created rule holds that the Department of Securities may only clawback 
those profits reflective of artificially high dividends.147  What will not be 
allowed is the attempt to reclaim those profits determined to have a 
“reasonable interest thereon”148 as the court declined to hold that every 
investor who made a profit through a Ponzi scheme is, as a matter of law, 
unjustly enriched.149  Instead, in the context of a Ponzi scheme, unjust 
                                                                                                                 
UFTA.  Id.  Importantly, “[a]lmost all courts have held that a debtor does not receive 
reasonably equivalent value or fair consideration for any payments made to its investors 
which represent fictitious profits.”  Id. at 164-65.  This is because there are no legitimate 
profits, or anything of value, to transfer.  However, the courts that have found reasonably 
equivalent value present have reasoned that the “[p]ayments up to the amount of the initial 
investment are considered to be exchanged for ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ and thus not 
fraudulent, because they proportionally reduce the investors' rights to restitution.”  Sonn, 
supra note 36, at 468.  
 141. Blair, 231 P.3d at 660-61. 
 142. Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (quoting Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 
343 B.R. 615, 640-41 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (citations omitted)).  
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enrichment will be found only where an “unreasonably high dividend”150 is 
distributed to a winning investor. 
In the dissenting opinion, Justice James Winchester recognized the 
challenges in balancing the competing interests involved.151  Ultimately, the 
dissent argued, the holding “leaves the district court with unsatisfactory 
subjective standards to determine what profits are unreasonable.”152  Seeking 
guidance from Johnson, the dissent recognized there is no “neat answer” and 
that, instead, perhaps the best option would be to leave the parties as they 
are.153  By implementing this standard and allowing the clawbacks to 
proceed, the dissent argued, investors must now take an additional risk when 
investing:  a risk of “subsequent government intervention to take back the 
funds.”154  Although innocent investors are involved, the dissent noted that 
those individuals must assume responsibility for their own investigations and 
research before investing their money. 155 
V. Analysis:  As the Scheme Falls, the Questions Build in Oklahoma 
Clawback Litigation 
If the ultimate goal of a clawback effort is to make as many creditors as 
whole as possible, Blair’s new standard of unreasonableness may insert novel 
problems into an already fragmented area of law and equity.  Alternatively, if 
the goal is to leave the parties as they stand, because they were not unjustly 
enriched by Ponzi profits, Blair’s holding will similarly fail to accomplish 
this objective.  The court announced its standard of recovery with no 
guideposts for standardization that a district court could consider, while 
disregarding the possibility of a bright-line standard of recovery.  While the 
flexibility of an equitable approach in clawback suits against winning Ponzi 
scheme investors may allow for courts to arrive at an outcome deemed fair 
(to the extent possible in the situation of a failed Ponzi scheme), the standard 
of unreasonableness presented in Blair may similarly produce another avenue 
for similarly-situated winning investors to be treated in different fashions.  In 
addition, losing investors will recover less money if winning investors are 
allowed to keep more.  Ultimately, both state and federal jurisdictions may be 
best served by the implementation of legislation specifically targeting 
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fraudulent endeavors such as the Ponzi scheme and enabling the courts to 
address Ponzi scheme clawbacks adequately.   
A. Can a Reasonableness Standard Be Applied to an Inherently 
Unreasonable Ponzi Scheme? 
As the dissenting opinion observes, the standard of unreasonableness 
concerning a clawback claim against a winning Ponzi scheme investor may 
present problems in practice.156  Indeed the concept of reasonableness may be 
ill-suited for encompassing anything related to Ponzi scheme “profits.”  The 
method for actually calculating what will constitute unreasonable profits 
(within the broader context of an unfair, fraudulent scheme with no actual 
profits of course) is left unarticulated by the court in Blair, leaving little 
guidance for the lower courts in practice. From both the perspective of 
winning investors concerned that they will be forced to return funds and 
losing investors hoping to see the return of some of their investment, Blair’s 
standard might appear as nothing more than arbitrary. 
In a statutory analysis of a clawback claim through the Bankruptcy Code, 
by comparison, reasonably equivalent value can be determined  
simply by the extinguishment of an antecedent debt.157  This provides a built-
in element for the court to analyze an amount of reasonableness by a strict 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. The Oklahoma court imposes the rationale presented in some federal bankruptcy-
based clawback proceedings, relying on the Bankruptcy Code, that if reasonably equivalent 
value is exchanged in a particular transaction, it is not avoidable. See Paul Sinclair & 
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generis.” Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985) (emphasis 
added), aff’d 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987).  
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statutory reading.  However, the unreasonableness of “profit” in terms of 
unjust enrichment demands a different equation when the “real world” facts 
are the very basis of the claim.  While a strict statutory analysis may allow for 
a focus on the individualized transactions involved in the Ponzi scheme, a 
focus based in equity would require explicit attention paid to the nature of the 
overall enterprise.   
First, current Ponzi profit is determined simply by the “netting” rule, 
whereby the trustee or receiver determines if a given investor was a net-
winner or a net-loser in the enterprise.158  Importantly, the receiver need not 
“match-up” every investment and payment and deal with the different 
players’ “characterizations of the transfers”—instead, the concern is the 
difference between money in and money out.159  “[Netting] may be the only 
workable rule in the typical Ponzi-scheme case, where documentation of 
transfers is less than complete, payments are sporadic and not always in 
accordance with the documentation of the investment, and neither the 
investor nor the debtor can recall precisely what the parties intended.”160  
Even this task is not simple for a receiver, but it may become even more 
difficult with Oklahoma’s unreasonableness benchmark because instead of 
simply determining a net winner or net loser, more information and analysis 
will be required to determine whether a net winner reaped a reasonable profit 
or not. 
At first glance, it would appear that a comparable market analysis may be 
possible given the recorded prices of securities in a given market within a 
certain time-frame.  Yet the Ponzi schemer doesn’t adhere to the rules of 
operation that would make an analysis viable on a consistent basis.  Ponzi 
schemers fail to maintain precise records,161 tend to disregard laws or 
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 161. Indeed, 
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regulations, and make their living with falsities, including the promise of an 
unrealistically high rate of return on an investment.162   
While equity allows courts flexibility to consider factors of an individual 
case and set of circumstances,163 its goals cannot be furthered if accurate facts 
of the case cannot be ascertained.  Where the focus is a “classic” Ponzi 
scheme that preys upon the unwavering trust of one’s neighbors and the only 
information exchanged between schemer and investor is vague, unconfirmed, 
and riddled with lies, the facts necessary for a comparative analysis of 
security prices, for example, may be nothing short of impossible.  
In Blair, Marsha Schubert failed to provide standard or authentic 
investment statements to her investors or any of the necessary tax 
statements.164  In one instance, an investor failed to receive a notice from 
Schubert for over four months165 (granted any such statement would be 
fictitious as she never invested any of the money).  Experts warn that 
investors should always receive written confirmation as to transactions 
regarding their accounts, something Schubert likewise failed to produce.166  
Like Schubert, schemers may instead make only verbal reports to investors as 
to what investments they made.  In some extreme cases, a schemer could 
feasibly never identify a particular security to an investor—hence making a 
market comparison for the purposes of a “reasonableness” determination 
impossible on its face.  
While the court need not prescribe every factor to be examined by a 
district court when determining whether or not a winning investor’s profit 
was “unreasonable,” an enunciation of basic guideposts might have resulted 
in more uniform treatment of winning investors.  As it stands, Blair’s 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Schubert promised returns of 30% to her investors in the scheme. Marks, supra note 
1.  Also to be considered is when a schemer promises a lower rate of return but consistently 
delivers that return, often against common sense:  “In retrospect, with more complete 
information on Madoff’s investments, the alleged returns now appear to be virtually—and in 
some cases, truly—impossible to achieve. Madoff informed investors that he returned an 
average of 15.7% per year since January 1996.”  Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 394.  
Indeed as Judge Richard Posner has noted, 
Only a very foolish, very naïve, very greedy, or very Machiavellian investor 
would jump at a chance to obtain a return on his passive investment of 10 to 20 
percent a month . . . .  It should be obvious that such returns are not available to 
passive investors in any known market, save from the operation of luck. 
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 163. “Equity is based upon the circumstances of the particular case before the court.”  
Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 661 (Okla. 2010). 
 164. Plaintiffs’ Petition, supra note 114, at *8.  
 165. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Rogue Broker, supra note 1. 
 166. Id. 
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standard does little to assuage, and perhaps even intensifies, the fact that 
winning Ponzi scheme investors “even if innocent of any fraud themselves, 
are not in an equitably stronger position vis-a-vis the losing investors, and 
should not be permitted to benefit at the expense of the losing investor.”167  
Established guideposts for unreasonableness would direct lower courts 
toward reliable information regarding the investments actually available and 
what role such facts should play.  As the Blair dissent cautions, the broad 
conclusion of unreasonableness presents the risk of inviting appeals168—a 
risk that will require more judicial and administrative time and resources. 
Perhaps the court’s silence reflects the fact that, when dealing with a failed 
Ponzi scheme, there is no neat or logical answer.  Searching for something 
“reasonable” or objective in an inherently unreasonable situation will yield 
nothing.  For instance, the promised rate of return presented by the schemer 
to the investor would be a simple starting point.  If the schemer grossly 
inflated the promised rate, perhaps an investor should have been on notice 
and the court could consider this an element of unreasonableness.  However, 
the very nature of a Ponzi scheme would presuppose that the promised rate of 
return would be groundless in any financial reality, thus creating a 
presumption of unreasonableness across the board.  As the Department of 
Securities has stated in its subsequent complaints regarding the winning 
investors on remand, the parties involved “did not contract for a 
commercially reasonable rate of interest.”169  The unreasonableness may 
begin at the very inception of the scam.  Remembering the workings of a 
Ponzi scheme, all investors would be similarly situated in this regard, making 
a factor like this perhaps moot when attempting to determine an unreasonable 
profit.  
What specific market conditions, then, could a finder of fact use and obtain 
after the fact (remembering the lack of proper records and false oral promises 
that often accompany a Ponzi scheme170) which would be of sufficient quality 
to be the basis of a decision affecting people’s lives, perhaps years after the 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 403. 
 168. Blair, 231 P.3d at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting).   
 169. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Daniel and Crystal 
Jackson, and Brief in Support at 5, Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Mathews, No. CJ-
2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385969 (Okla. Cnty. Ct. Aug. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Daniel and Crystal Jackson] (emphasis 
added). 
 170. See Davidson, Loewenson & Midkiff, supra note 161; see also Anatomy of a Fraud: 
The Rogue Broker, supra note 1. 
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“profits” are gone?171  Many would simply find none.  Here it is not only a 
matter of perspective, it is a matter of legal adequacy.  Again, as the 
Department of Securities argues, “[t]he Court should not step in to restructure 
the investment agreement or contract, particularly in a situation such as this 
where the speculative nature of the fictitious enterprise would prohibit the 
formulation of an obvious, equitable and objective rate of return.”172 
More importantly, what should a finder of fact not consider when 
attempting to establish unreasonableness in a Ponzi-scheme profit?  One 
investor may claim his or her profit should be defined in relation to the final 
profits of other investors as they all presumably bargained for inflated rates of 
return.  Another may clamor that the unreasonableness of his or her return 
may only be satisfied by an objective, factual-based analysis of what the 
actual registered securities were doing in the time frame the schemer claimed 
to be investing.  Yet again, the ability to locate objective, accurate 
information seems a monumental task when truthful records are nonexistent.  
For example, as the Department of Securities has argued in subsequent 
filings of the Schubert clawback cases on remand, “[b]ecause options trading 
and day trading are so highly speculative and dependent on the trader's luck 
and skill at timing market fluctuations, it would be impossible to compare one 
trader's returns to another’s in determining a reasonable investment profit.”173  
Now courts must expend judicial time and resources to create a working set 
of factors that may be years in the making.174 
                                                                                                                 
 171. The Blair court recognized hardships of winning investors who are required to give 
the money they thought was actual profit back to the receiver or bankruptcy trustee:  “Some 
investors who received ‘fictitious profits’ may have spent the money on education or other 
necessities many years ago.  What else in equity and good conscience should plaintiffs who 
received money in good faith pursuant to an ‘investment contract’ have done?”  Blair, 231 
P.3d at 662 (quoting Johnson v. Studholme, 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d, 
833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987)).  
 172. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Daniel and Crystal 
Jackson, supra note 169, at 5 (emphasis added).  
 173. Id. (emphasis added).   
 174. The Department has started to proceed with their clawback claims, attempting to 
implement the unreasonableness standard into their analysis.  However the current claims 
present very high rates of return that perhaps will not require the courts to go into a more 
detailed analysis of factors as may be necessary when the rates of return as to 
“reasonableness” are not as obvious.  See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Defendants, Daniel and Crystal Jackson, supra note 169, at 5 (alleging 311% rate of return 
on investment); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Kenneth and 
Leslie Young, and Brief in Support at 3, 6, Mathews, No. CJ-2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385971 
(alleging 61% rate of return on investment); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Defendants, K.R. and Dana Larue, and Brief in Support at 3, 6, Mathews, No. CJ-
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Other state courts that have allowed clawback suits under an unjust 
enrichment theory have not taken the subsequent step the Oklahoma court did 
in Blair to qualify the clawback amount via a threshold of unreasonableness. 
175  Like the court in Chosnek176 that found that an innocent, winning investor 
is not unjustly enriched only to the point of receiving returns upon his or her 
original investment,177 Oklahoma could have adopted a more streamlined 
approach.  Other federal courts that have similarly allowed unjust 
enrichment-based clawbacks to proceed have kept to the standardized 
approach:  the amount over the initial investment that can be classified as 
profit is subject to clawback178 or the presence of any funds representing an 
unjust enrichment of any kind may be clawed back.179 
Further, the larger policy goals of the Department of Securities and 
securities enforcement agencies as a whole that the Oklahoma court 
observes—to protect both the public and investors, to consider the promotion 
of “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”180—are not spared by this 
new clawback measure.  Specifically in terms of efficiency, Ponzi scheme 
receivers or the Department of Securities itself (pending the particular case) 
in Oklahoma will seemingly have to go beyond the standard netting analysis 
expected in other jurisdictions, costing time and resources with the realistic 
possibility of not clawing back actual Ponzi profits.  This may deter 
litigation; however, litigation is a valuable tool for receivers to seek some 
amount of recourse for losing investors (now creditors).  Also, winning 
investors who consider their profits reasonable may hesitate or decline to 
enter into a settlement agreement with the receiver; instead, they may “roll 
the dice” to see if they will be allowed to retain the money pending a 
determination of unreasonableness.   
                                                                                                                 
2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385972 (alleging 246% rate of return on investment); Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants, Rod and Wanda Martin, and Brief in 
Support at 3, 6, Mathews, No. CJ-2005-3796, 2010 WL 3385974 (alleging 89% rate of 
return on investment). 
 175. Oklahoma was seemingly the first state court to implement this restriction of a Ponzi 
clawback amount as a court in sitting in equity as the opinion fails to cite another such 
jurisdiction that has accepted an unreasonableness profit qualification.  Also, a Westlaw 
search as of January 13, 2011 failed to find another state court opinion accepting this 
standard in response to an equity-based claim. 
 176. Chosnek v. Rolley, 688 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).  
 177. Id. at 210-11. 
 178. See, Hecht v. Malvern Preparatory Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d. 395, (E.D. Pa. 2010);  
 179. See Hays v. Adam, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1343-4 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 180. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 662-63 (Okla. 2010). 
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Perhaps the Department of Securities, receiver and investors would be best 
served with the status quo at this point; the simple equation wherein “[a]ll [a 
winning investor] is being asked to do is to return the net profits of his 
investment—the difference between what he put in at the beginning and what 
he had at the end.”181  The Oklahoma standard in practice does not solve the 
existing clawback dichotomy of winning investor and losing investor.  
Instead, a new equation of losing investors, winning investors with 
unreasonable profit, and winning investors with reasonable profits will 
potentially increase the litigation and the problems of “unfairness” already 
showcased in existing clawback litigation. 
B. Downstream Effects:  Altering the Amounts in the Ultimate Pro Rata 
Distribution 
If Oklahoma is to utilize an unreasonableness standard for Ponzi clawback 
litigation, a subsequent pro rata distribution scheme would be inherently 
skewed.  From the perspective of losing investors and other creditors of the 
scheme, funds that should be distributed by the receiver in the hopes of 
breaking even on their initial investment may instead continue to sit with the 
winning investors.  As already noted, the receiver bears a huge burden to 
locate and clawback these fraudulent or unjustly enriching funds.  A 
subsequent concern now is that the money may be located, but an 
unreasonableness criteria may stand as a roadblock in distributing those funds 
to losing investors. 
Pro rata has generally been the method adopted to bring winning and 
losing investors and other potential creditors of the estate into some 
semblance of parity.182  But the ultimate degree of parity is dependent upon 
what the receiver is able to accumulate in the “pot” to distribute.  Again, the 
Ponzi scheme provides specific problems that have made a pro rata 
distribution plan widely accepted because once-individual funds have been 
commingled beyond differentiation.183  The rule established in Cunningham-
that tracing presumptions cannot be allowed when the parties are all victims 
of the same fraud and the property is commingled to the point one’s funds 
cannot be traced directly and thus a pro rata scheme is appropriate,184-might 
not seem reconcilable with the Blair unreasonableness standard.  If a receiver 
cannot clawback as much money because Ponzi profit now in the hands of a 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 403 (citation omitted). 
 182. See id. at 402.  
 183. See Rosa, supra note 93, at 1348.  
 184. See id.  
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winning investor is considered reasonable, less money is available for 
distribution ratably among the losing investors and other creditors.185  
While tracing is technically still possible from a legal standpoint, the 
practical realities of a Ponzi scheme make the ability slim.186  Because of 
such a practical matter, most of the distributions will be delegated to the 
accepted pro rata scheme.  However the pro rata scheme will face new 
problems with an unreasonableness standard—ultimately affecting how much 
recovery a losing investor could see.  For a simple example, assume a 
receiver has a balance of $100,000 that is available to distribute to losing 
Ponzi scheme investors.  The claims for distribution submitted by those 
losing investors to the receiver equal $1,000,000.  Under this brief example 
the pro rata percentage would equate to 10% (an amount that translates to 10 
cents on the dollar).  Now assume that the receiver’s balance increases to 
$150,000.  The pro rata percentage increases to 15%  (or 15 cents on the 
dollar) of the loss of each investor.  These incremental increases might not 
seem significant at first glance, but when these small amounts are 
compounded (perhaps even millions of times for each dollar invested in a 
scheme), the potential losses for an already losing investor add up quickly.   
The Blair court strives for equity, but equity must be followed through the 
entire set of Ponzi scheme consequences.  For instance, in early 2010 the 
Ohio federal district court in Gordon v. Dadante187 held that while a pro rata 
plan would not be perfect, it was the most equitable method presented.188  
That court held that the innocent investors should share equally in the 
recovered, clawed-back funds because “equity demands equal treatment.”189  
That principle could also be reflected through winning investors sharing 
equally by all contributing to the “pot” available for distribution, rather than 
some winning investors facing disgorgement and others not.  Pro rata 
schemes have consistently been upheld at the federal level190 for practical 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See McDermott, supra note 18, at 164. 
 186. See Rosa, supra note 93, at 1349-50. 
 187. No. 1:05-CV-2726, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1979 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2010). 
 188. Id. at *13 (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. at *18 (emphasis added). 
 190. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Byers 637 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); S.E.C. v. Drucker, 
318 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 2004).  It is important to note here that:  
[B]ecause receivers are appointed as an exercise of equity, they are given wide 
latitude in proposing distribution methods for the remaining assets. Receivers 
are not limited to the requirements of the bankruptcy laws or any other 
distribution method. As long as their proposal satisfies the demands of equity 
and is approved as an act of the Court (within the limits of the Court's 
discretion) any proposed distribution method will be considered valid and 
enforceable against the objections of third parties.  
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reasons as the Oklahoma court noted.  When investors have lost everything, 
any amount they may recover is significant (both monetarily and 
psychologically).  The unreasonableness standard goes beyond the immediate 
winning investor—it potentially further interferes with the subsequent 
treatment of losing investors and creditors.   
C. Clarity Among the Confusion:  The Need to Consider Ponzi-Specific 
Clawback Legislation 
Quite simply, neither principles of equity nor current statutory provisions 
can fully encompass the maze of innocent people and transferred funds in 
Ponzi schemes.  While no one can technically win when the scheme fails, 
courts have noticed the silence of legislatures as to the Ponzi scheme 
clawbacks and recognized that current tools at their disposal have significant 
shortcomings.  The Blair court remarked that the Oklahoma legislature could 
not only assert that the Department of Securities is authorized to seek equity-
based clawbacks against winning Ponzi scheme investors but also enunciate 
what would be the subsequent “rights and liabilities” of those winning and 
losing Ponzi investors.191   
“The remedies provided under the law are less than satisfactory since it 
will be a matter of chance whether a particular innocent investor is a winning 
or losing investor.”192  The statutes used in clawback litigation were not 
explicitly written for such a purpose.193  Specifically, under the UFTA 
problems can arise from the limited reach-back periods, as only those 
                                                                                                                 
Ralph S. Janvey, Commercial Fraud Task Force on a Collision Course: Ponzi Schemes, 
Bankruptcy, Receiverships and Forfeitures (Am. Bankr. Inst., 21st Ann. Winter Leadership 
Conf., Dec. 3, 2009), available at 120309 ABI-CLE 355 (Westlaw). 
 191. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 670 (Okla. 2010).  In 
terms of a Ponzi estate now in Bankruptcy proceedings, a recent court noted: “if Congress 
did not intend such a result when the debtor was involved in a Ponzi scheme, it should so 
specify in the Bankruptcy Code rather than leaving it to the courts to ignore what is clearly 
value and fair consideration under the conveyance statutes.”  In re Canyon Sys. Corp., 343 
B.R. 615, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006). 
 192. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 403 (emphasis added).  
 193. One frustrated court explained when trying to reconcile a Ponzi scheme within the 
context of the current Bankruptcy scheme:  
By forcing the square peg facts of a ‘Ponzi’ scheme into the round holes of the 
fraudulent conveyance statutes in order to accomplish a further reallocation and 
redistribution to implement a policy of equality of distribution in the name of 
equity, I believe that many courts have done a substantial injustice to those 
statutes and have made policy decisions that should be made by Congress.  
In re Unified Commercial Capital, 260 B.R. 343, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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transfers made during the actual enumerated period are avoidable.194  In 
Oklahoma the reach back period is four years,195 as is the case with other 
UFTA jurisdictions.196  Through the fraudulent conveyance laws, nothing 
“require[s] every innocent investor to surrender as fraudulent transfers any 
and all payments received by the investor from the scheme.”197  Thus, profits 
received outside of the statutory time frame will not be subject to clawback 
by the receiver and will not be part of the estate that can be distributed to 
creditors and losing investors.  To make up for the shortfall, some recent 
scholars have suggested the implementation of contractual clawbacks.198  
While the UFTA approach provides a receiver an established route199 to 
pursue clawbacks, it is not a perfect fit because of the very nature of a Ponzi 
scheme given that one single enterprise can run for years, if not decades.200  
The UFTA presents its own line in the sand that can cause practical problems 
for receivers and losing investors alike.  If legislatures explicitly stated that 
the jurisdiction’s fraudulent transfer statutes would not be eligible for use in 
Ponzi clawback claims, reach-back time frames would not be at issue.  
Conversely, a legislative body could unambiguously state that their 
jurisdiction’s statutory provision is indeed available for use by an appropriate 
party for a Ponzi clawback claim.  Regardless of the particular point of view 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See id. 
 195. Under Oklahoma’s UFTA the time limit to a proceeding is four years “after the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one (1) year after the 
transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.” 24 
OKLA. STAT. § 121(1) (2011).  
 196. While the UFTA reach back period remains at four years from the transaction date, 
§ 548 of the Bankruptcy Code “allows avoidance of only those transfers made within one 
year prior to the petition date.”  McDermott, supra note 18, at 160 n.15. 
 197. Cherry & Wong, supra note 21, at 405.  
 198. Id. at 408-10. 
 199. See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the routine 
application of UFTA  for bankruptcy-based Ponzi scheme clawbacks and extending the 
availability to receivers); Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining 
standing of receiver to proceed with UFTA claim under the implied provisions of the 
statute).  
 200. Schubert’s scheme ran from December 1999 to October 2004, for example.  Okla. 
Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010).  If her first investor 
invested in December 1999, that person would fall outside of the reach back period under 
UFTA.  There are disputes as to how long Bernard Madoff’s scheme actually lasted but the 
scheme appears to have lasted at least two decades.  Ben Levisohn, Madoff Pleads Guilty to 
Ponzi Scheme, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 12, 2009, 4:05 PM ET), http://www. 
businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2009/db20090312_431966.htm.  
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the legislature accepts, either option would streamline and standardize the 
potential litigation.   
Besides problems with statutory approaches to Ponzi clawbacks, the 
central tenants of equity similarly cannot fully encompass the logistical and 
ethical concerns of Ponzi clawbacks.  The Blair court, for instance, assumed 
that winning investors are only unjustly enriched when a threshold is 
crossed—not when they receive any “profit” from the scheme—even though 
all of the “profits” come from the same source.  The effect of the Blair 
holding presents new avenues of questioning as it appears some winning 
investors will be unjustly enriched from the same Ponzi fund while other 
winning investors will not.  Also, unjust enrichment, defined in Oklahoma as 
occurring when it would be against equity to “retain a benefit which has 
come at the expense of another,”201 doesn’t necessarily encompass the fact 
that two innocent groups of investors must contend with each other—rather 
than a culpable party.  When receivers or trustees attempt to clawback the 
funds among equally innocent investors, a causal disconnect can result in the 
parties remaining as they are because the courts struggle to fit two groups of 
“round” investors into “square” holes.  Certain courts like the Tenth Circuit 
in Johnson simply may fail to see how the winning investors were unjustly 
enriched and deny an opportunity for further relief for losing investors.202  
Similarly, the tools of equity have trouble factoring in the differing points 
of view of winning investors, losing investors, and the Ponzi schemer himself 
in effectuating the necessary actions of clawing back profits.  Restitution, on 
the one hand, is a remedy with the purpose of compensating the victims of 
security frauds for their losses,203 while disgorgement is the requirement to 
disgorge funds obtained from his or her violation of securities laws.204  
Restitution itself “does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the 
result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is 
equitable to do so . . . .  It must be a realistic determination based on a broad 
view of the human setting involved.”205  Not surprisingly the facts of a Ponzi 
scheme can spin such a notion in circles without any clear answer—someone 
will ultimately have to lose in the end, and no option is more equitable than 
another. 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See N.C. Corff P’ship v. OXY USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) 
(quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (1973)). 
 202. 619 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (D. Colo. 1985), aff’d, 833 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987).  
 203. See Blair, 231 P.3d at 654. 
 204. See id. (explaining the role of disgorgement within the context of ill-gotten gains). 
 205. 66 AM.JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (2011).  
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Alternatively, if the purpose of disgorgement “is not to compensate the 
victims of the fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains,”206 
again an unreasonableness standard frustrates such a purpose.  The winning 
investor presumptively did not set out to perpetrate a fraud nor partake in an 
action for which they themselves should be punished (unless they were aware 
of the scheme or otherwise involved).  Essentially, disgorgement does not 
solely deprive the Ponzi schemer himself, but the innocent he defrauded 
along the way.  If, under an unreasonableness clawback standard a winning 
investor is not disgorged, however, the only people continually being 
punished are the losing investors.   
Because there are currently no clear or concise judicial answers or 
equitable methods to address Ponzi clawbacks directly, the opportunity is ripe 
for legislatures to have their say.  One option would be to limit the ability of a 
receiver or another entity from commencing a clawback claim against a 
winning investor unless a legal finding of culpability on the part of that 
investor is established.  The central tension of disgorging innocent investors 
of money they received in good faith could be diffused by requiring a legal 
finding of culpability as a standardization of the process.  Another option 
would be for the legislature explicitly to adopt a caveat emptor point of view 
through explicit legislation preventing the pursuit of clawbacks by a state 
agency like the Department of Securities.  Investing is risky business, and the 
legislature may debate the merit of clawbacks effecting to restructure such 
agreements after-the-fact. 
The current patchwork of law and equity has created inconsistent 
treatment of Ponzi scheme clawbacks.207  The Oklahoma court sought to 
understand and work with the difficult facts of winning and losing investors 
being equally blameless, but their starting point may lead to unintended paths 
and corresponding problems.  Both state and federal legislators can and 
should set the tone and put potential investors on notice as to the even more 
potentially risky investment they are about to make—they may be subject to 
clawbacks upon the discovery of the scheme or they may find themselves in a 
more lenient jurisdiction wherein they can increase their initial gamble in the 
securities market.  As the Blair dissent noted, “the individual must be 
responsible for investigating before investing.”208  Legislators can use this 
opportunity to understand the real-world impact of these clawback claims and 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Blair, 231 P.3d at 654. 
 207. This appears to hold true also within the context of the Bankruptcy Code.  See 
Mallory A. Sullivan, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary Distribution of Assets After 
Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1589, 1632-33 (2011).  
 208. Blair, 231 P.3d at 671 (Winchester, J., dissenting). 
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make a fact-based determination of the most efficient and equitable method 
to determine what claims certain parties have. 
VI. Conclusion 
Ponzi scheme clawbacks will never be “fair” to all the parties concerned 
because not enough money is available to go around.  Winning investors, 
losing investors and receivers all have different points of view regarding 
clawback actions, and it would be impossible for all the parties to be satisfied 
with the outcome.  Oklahoma’s decision to impose an unreasonableness 
standard into this already complicated set of circumstances creates confusion 
and handicaps losing investors.  This unreasonableness standard stands to 
complicate the accepted pro rata method of distribution and increases the 
need for a statutory definition of the rights of investors, creditors and 
interested government agencies.  For now, instead of being left with more 
money as promised, Ponzi investors are simply left with more problems.  
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